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MINIMUM WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION: 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS USING THE DISPLACED WORKERS SURVEY 
Stephanie Rohn 
Honors Thesis 
Department ofEconomics 
University of Redlands 
May25, 2006 
Abstract: This paper examines the impact of minimum wages on unemployment duration 
for displaced workers. I utilize the Displaced Worker Survey to examine the effects of 
minimum wages, while controlling for individual characteristics, and state and year 
effects that may be correlated with the value of the state minimum wage. The empirical 
results suggest that an increase in the minimum wage may have differential effects which 
are conditional upon receipt of unemployment insurance; however, there are no overall 
increases in unemployment duration associated with higher minimum wages. These 
results are robust to changes in specification and different measures designed to capture 
the binding nature of a given state minimum wage. 
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I. Introduction 
The effects of a state minimum wage and unemployment insurance (UI) on the 
length of unemployment for displaced workers have been researched independently, but 
have not been observed simultaneously for displaced worker. Theoretically, a higher 
minimum wage and the receipt of UI measured independently may indirectly prolong the 
time that an individual remains unemployed. While theory is essential in constructing a 
practical model, it does not clearly indicate what effects an increase in the minimum 
wage will have on unemployment duration. The empirical work presented in this paper 
attempts to answer the questions that theory cannot. 
Most labor literature utilizes the traditional neoclassical model when predicting 
the effects of an increase in the minimum wage and the receipt of UI on employment 
levels. This theoretical model predicts negative effects on employment levels following 
an increase in the minimum wage, which occur because the demand for labor is reduced 
while the supply for labor concurrently increases. This model indirectly predicts a 
prolonged unemployment spell following the receipt of UI. Perfectly competitive 
markets are appropriately analyzed using this model, but not all labor markets can be 
correctly analyzed with this limited model. For example, labor markets may not have all 
the characteristics that the traditional neoclassical model assumes; a homogenous work 
force, exogenously determined productivity, full information, and agents who are wage-
takers. Furthermore, theoretical work has shown that predicted minimum wage effects 
may be highly sensitive to the assumed labor market characteristics. It is important, 
therefore, to examine different theoretical and empirical models. Variations of empirical 
models and the traditional neoclassical theory are presented later in the paper. 
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Conventional theory fails to discuss the connection and importance of 
employment levels and unemployment spells. A worker's well-being may be indirectly 
affected following an increase in the minimum wage. For example, inexperienced 
workers may lose the ability to accumulate earnings growth associated with long periods 
of unemployment, and experienced workers may lose the immediate income that they 
would have potentially earned at the pre-displacement job (Kletzer and Fairlie 2003). 
Unemployment spells, however, generate costs beyond the immediate loss of income and 
purchasing power. Prolonged unemployment spells may cause some workers to become 
underemployed by accepting a part-time job following displacement from a full-time job 
(McCall 1997). Also, longer spells of unemployment are associated with a deterioration 
of previously accumulated human capital, increased poverty risk, and social exclusion 
(Kletzer 1998). Longer unemployment spells may be problematic following an increase 
in the minimum wage regardless of the positive effects it may have on employment levels. 
This paper bridges the gap between the minimum wage and displacement duration 
literature by empirically observing the effects of an increase in the minimum wage on 
unemployment duration for displaced workers. The minimum wage effects are observed 
for displaced workers who received UI and those who did not are investigated. The 
sample of displaced workers is taken from the 1996, 1998, and 2000 Displaced Workers 
Survey (DWS). The objective is to determine whether an increase in the minimum wage 
has positive, negative or no effect on the length of unemployment for the typical 
displaced worker. Four specifications of an empirical model are utilized in order to 
estimate the minimum wage effects on unemployment duration, whereas, the robustness 
J 
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of observed minimum wage estimates is examined by varying some control variables and 
the minimum wage measurement. 
My principle findings are as follows. First, an increase in the minimum wage 
may have different effects on unemployment duration which are conditional upon the 
receipt of UI. However, there are no overall increases in unemployment duration 
associated with higher minimum wages. Male VI-recipients had the strongest statistical 
relationship between the minimum wage and unemployment duration. These results are 
robust to changes in specification of the model and different measures designed to 
capture the binding nature of a given state minimum wage. 
Second, my results are not consistent with some interpretations of the traditional 
neoclassical theory. These theories suggest a negative impact on employment levels and 
unemployment spells following an increase in the minimum wage. My empirical results 
indicate that unemployment durations are shortened for both male and female non-UI and 
UI recipients following an increase in the minimum wage. These empirical findings are 
most consistent with the monopsony theory presented by Card and Krueger (1995). 
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II. Review of the Literature 
Individuals who are defined as displaced have not been fired or left work 
voluntarily. Some of the reasons which cause displacement are: plant closings, 
terminated positions or shifts, insufficient amounts of work, and other related reasons. 
Researchers continue to analyze the causes and trends of displacement, but they have 
failed to focus on the effects that an increase in the minimum wage may have on 
displaced workers' unemployment durations. The effect of a minimum wage policy on is 
an important issue to address due to the currently increasing number of displaced workers 
within the United States' economy. 1 The issue of displaced workers' unemployment 
durations has not been exhausted, and thus deserves attention. Prolonged unemployment 
durations may result in loss of job-specific human capital, income, purchasing power, and 
accumulation of work experience (Kletzer 1998). This paper combines many different 
methods used in minimum wage models and those used in unemployment duration 
models. 
More specifically, this section will provide a detailed explanation of several labor 
market theories in addition to an analysis of the methodologies used in the minimum 
wage and unemployment duration literature. Some of the theories that are presented are 
not consistent with the empirical results presented in this paper, but are important to 
explore nonetheless. The traditional neoclassical model is the basis for each theory that 
1 The total number of displaced workers had increased from 2.4 percent (both male and female) in the mid-
1980s to 4.1 percent for males and 3.2 percent for females in the beginning of the 1990s. The total number 
of displaced workers began to decrease, however, in the mid-1990s to 2.8 percent for males and 3.2 percent 
for females (Hipple 1999). Unfortunately, this declining rate was not maintained throughout the early 
2000s. According to the BLS' 2004 Displaced Workers Summary, the total number of long-tenured 
(having at least 3 years) displaced workers increased from 4.0 million for the 1999-2001 period which is 
covered in the 2002 DWS to 5.3 million for the 2001-2003 period covered in the 2004 DWS. 
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is discussed, but the effects on employment levels and unemployment duration may vary 
after certain assumptions of the traditional neoclassical model are relaxed. 
Minimum Wages 
The effects of an increase in the mm1mum wage have important policy 
implications for the growing number of displaced workers. Researchers, however, have 
not arrived at a consensus concerning the estimated effects of an increase in the minimum 
wage on employment (see Neumark and Wascher 1992, and Card and Krueger 1995). 
Because the minimum wage literature is inconclusive on the effects of an increase in the 
minimum wage, further research is necessary. The minimum wage research, which 
focuses on employment effects, can be categorized in the following way: (1) that which 
finds a decrease in employment following an increase in the minimum wage (Neumark 
and Wascher 1992; Couch and Wittenburg 2001), (2) that which finds an increase in 
employment following an increase in the minimum wage (Card and Krueger 1995; 
Connolly 2002), and (3) that which finds minimal or no effects following an increase in 
the minimum wage (Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg 2000). 2 It follows that if an 
increase in the minimum wage yields positive effects on employment, then it may also 
decrease displaced workers' unemployment duration. Equally, an increase in the 
minimum wage may have positive effects on employment levels, but negative effects on 
displaced workers' unemployment duration. 
2 Studies examining the impact of minimum wages on training have also observed minimal effects for an 
increase in the minimum wage. For a more detailed discussion see, Fairris and Pedace (2004). 
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Most of the minimum wage studies utilize the traditional neoclassical models to 
estimate minimum wage effects, while other studies alter the traditional model. 3 
Regardless of which model is used, a set of core variables - age, gender, education, race, 
and marital status, for example- are typically included in minimum wage models that 
estimate employment outcomes (Neumark and Wascher 1992; Couch and Wittenburg 
2001; Connolly 2002). Other literature focuses on variables which are not commonly 
used in minimum wage models, such as the receipt of UI (McCall 1997; Addison and 
Portugal 1990). Those studies which alter the traditional model tend to find positive or 
no effects for an increase in the minimum wage. 
The minimum wage research which utilizes the traditional neoclassical model 
when observing minimum wage effects finds that an increase in the minimum wage tends 
to cause a decrease in employment (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999; Couch and 
Wittenburg 2001). Furthermore, the traditional neoclassical model predicts a decrease in 
unemployment relative to a decrease in a binding state minimum wage (Neumark, 
Schweitzer, & Wascher 1999, Ragacs 2004). 4 This model is the most common and uses 
the employment to population ratio in a given state and year as the dependent variable. 
This ratio is then regressed on a set of state-level characteristics that are thought to 
characterize the labor market. According to these studies, an inverse relationship 
between minimum wages and employment exists. 
Theoretically, the traditional neoclassical model predicts that an increase in the 
minimum wage will cause a firm to ultimately dismiss workers. This occurs because the 
3 The first strand of minimum wage literature utilizes the traditional neoclassical model, whereas the second 
and third strands utilize altered models that are variations of traditional neoclassical models. 
4 A binding minimum wage indicates a large impact on the typical worker following an increase in the 
minimum wage. 
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cost of labor and production increases. A firm will choose to lay off workers following 
an increase in the cost of labor because it this will allow it to maximize profits by 
minimizing costs. It is more profitable for the firm to dismiss low-wage workers in order 
to cut costs because their productivity is below the level of the new minimum wage 
holding productivity constant (Card and Krueger 1995; De Fraja 1999). After the low-
wage/low-productivity workers are dismissed, job availability within this and all similar 
firms decreases, while the pool of unemployed workers simultaneously increases. 
Assuming that turnover remains constant within these firms, unemployment duration for 
the currently unemployed will increase due to the greater number of individuals 
searching for fewer jobs. This effect would be exacerbated if the higher minimum wage 
induces more workers to enter the labor force. 
The traditional neoclassical predictions, however, become problematic because 
the model is closed, or in other words, it does not account for exogenous factors that may 
affect employment levels (Card and Krueger 1995; Ragacs 2004). This strand of 
literature indicates that firms may have monopsony power which could have a positive 
effect on employment following an increase in the minimum wage (Card and Krueger 
1995). The effects of an increase in the minimum wage are conditional upon specific 
regional characteristics, and this is why Card and Krueger (1995) estimate their models 
according to state. Some of the regional characteristics that Card and Krueger (1995) 
include in their models are local wages, population characteristics, and the number of 
workers who are receiving the minimum wage. These controls are important to include 
because employment levels may be correlated with any one ofthese characteristics. 
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The predictions of Card and Krueger's (1995) monopsonist model are conditional 
upon the magnitude of the increase in the minimum wage. 5 One scenario of the 
monopsony model will be discussed in this section due to the extensive number of 
possibilities: it is assumed that the minimum wage increase will produce positive 
employment effects. This occurs because, under the assumptions of the monopsonist 
model, a firm will operate with job vacancies. The most important assumption associated 
with the monopsonist model is that it has the ability to set the wage rate. Prior to an 
increase in the minimum wage, it is not profitable for a firm to fill all of its vacancies 
because it would have to increase wages for all of the currently employed workers in 
order to maintain the wage hierarchy (Card and Krueger 1995). The costs of production 
would dramatically increase in this scenario because the firm would incur the costs 
associated with employing more workers while simultaneously increasing the wages of 
the currently employed. Employment will increase following an increase in the 
minimum wage because the monopsonist finn is able to employment more workers 
without having to increase the wages for all workers in the firm. Additionally, only some 
of the job vacancies will be filled following an increase because it would not be 
profitable for all to be filled for the reasons previously mentioned. Because more 
individuals leave the state of unemployment, the pool of unemployed workers decreases, 
which causes their unemployment duration to decrease (holding turnover rates constant). 
5 Holding turnover rates constant, the monopsony model yields three predictions on employment levels 
following an increase in the minimum wage: (1) positive effects on employment levels may occur if the 
new wage does not exceed the point where marginal cost of labor meets the demand for labor, (2) negative 
effects on employment levels may occur if the increase is too large (defined as the point when labor costs 
begin to cut away the monopsonist 's profits) which occurs when the new wage exceeds the point where the 
marginal cost for labor meets the demand for labor, and (3) employment levels remain unchanged if the 
new wage is below the point where the marginal cost for labor meets the demand for labor (Card and 
Krueger 1995). 
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Some models produce results that are not altogether consistent with either the 
traditional neoclassical model or the monopsony model; these models vary the 
assumptions ofthe traditional neoclassical model (Stiglitz 1976; Yellen 1984; De Fraja 
1999; Burkhauser, et. al2000; Grossberg and Sicilian 2004). The effect of an increase in 
the state minimum wage may be conditional upon the selected group being observed 
within a particular data set. Grossberg and Sicilian (2004), for example, utilize the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to measure turnover rates after an 
mcrease in the state minimum wage. Despite the differential results for males and 
females, the different minimum wage models include similar variables used in the 
traditional neoclassical and monopsony models - education, race, marital status, and 
regional, industry, and occupational controls. 
De Fraja (1999) shows that after several assumptions of the traditional 
neoclassical model are relaxed, an increase in the minimum wage may cause bunching 
and spillover effects. The following assumptions are relaxed: (1) following an increase in 
the minimum wage a firm will lay off its least productive workers to minimize its costs, 
(2) there exists symmetric information between the firm and its workers, (3) workers 
receive the value of their marginal productivity, and (4) the firm operates in a perfectly 
competitive labor market. The first assumption is relaxed because it is assumed that it is 
less costly for a firm to increase the low-wage workers' productivity rather than 
dismissing them or increasing the high-wage workers' productivity. The second 
assumption is relaxed because it is assumed that a firm is not able to precisely determine 
a worker's productivity and/or work effort. The third assumption is relaxed because it is 
assumed that workers may receive wages higher than their marginal productivity (i.e. 
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efficiency wages). The fourth assumption is relaxed because a firm may have some 
degree of monopsony power in the labor market. The other assumptions of a perfectly 
competitive labor market, however, remain valid (e.g. firms seek to maximize profits). 
According to this model, an increase in the minimum wage will cause bunching and 
spillover effects within the firm (Card and Krueger 1995; De Fraja 1999). Bunching 
occurs when a firm does not lay off low-productivity workers after an increase in the 
minimum wage, but rather, increases the low-wage workers' productivity. A firm is able 
to directly increase low-wage productivity by worsening their working conditions -
extending the work day or requiring more tasks in a shorter amount of time, for example.6 
De Fraja (1999) indicates that a firm does not take this action prior to an increase in the 
minimum wage "because it was not profitable - not because it was making suboptimal 
choices." A firm minimizes its costs by taking this action because it is less expensive 
than to increase the productivity of the high-wage workers. In other words, bunching is 
the compression of the wage distribution beginning at the lower end. 
Furthermore, the low-wage worker receives a rent because he is paid a higher 
wage than he would demand to sell his labor. The rent a worker receives is equivalent to 
the additional utility created from the difference between his reservation wage and the 
actual received wage; the worker's utility increases as his rent increases. Initially one 
may assume that only the low-paid workers benefit following an increase in the minimum 
wage because they receive a higher wage than before. This, however, is not the case. A 
spillover effect is also observed. This occurs because high-wage workers also receive an 
increase in wages (Card and Krueger 1995). Therefore, both low- and high-wage 
6 This model should not be confused with the efficiency wage model. In this model, firms are able to 
directly affect worker productivity, whereas, in efficiency wage models, the worker voluntarily increases 
her own productivity. 
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workers experience increases in utility. Although the utility (or rent) increases for all 
workers, it is greater for workers who are hired at the minimum wage (Grossberg and 
Sicilian 2004). The opportunity cost associated with becoming unemployed increases for 
all workers within a firm. Thus, turnover rates decrease for this and all similar firms. 
Also, assuming that the number of jobs remains constant, fewer vacancies are available 
due to the decreased turnover rate. This indirectly increases the unemployment duration 
for the currently unemployed who apply for employment at this and all similar firms. 
The efficiency wage model is conditional upon a firm's ability to provide 
efficiency wages, which may have a negative effect on employment levels.7 This model 
is conditional upon the assumption that a firm has a degree of wage-setting power. A 
firm may provide efficiency wages to some workers in order to increase their marginal 
productivity. This may not occur for all points on the demand curve due to its positive 
slope for higher wages. It is upward sloping at higher wages because diminishing returns 
to productivity eventually minimize the positive effect of providing efficiency wages. 
Therefore, low-wage workers tend to receive higher levels of utility following an increase 
in their wage when compared to high-wage workers (Stiglitz 1976). Effective efficiency 
wages may reduce shirking and turnover rates, increase the quality of job applicants, 
and/or improve employee moral (Yellen 1984). Minimal or negative effects on 
employment are typically associated with efficiency wages because a firm is assumed to 
keep employment levels constant. It would not be profitable for a firm to hire more 
workers at the higher wage rate. Those who are currently unemployed would be willing 
7 The predictions of the efficiency wage model are conditional upon the location of the intersection of the 
supply and demand curve. Positive effects of employment may occur when the efficiency wage is on the 
upward sloping portion of the demand curve and negative effects may occur when the efficiency wage is on 
the downward sloping portion of the demand curve (Stiglitz 1976). 
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to work for a wage less than the efficiency wage, but a firm would not employ these 
workers because their productivity levels are below those who are currently employed 
(Yellen 1984). The efficiency wage model directly predicts negative effects on 
employment levels and indirectly predicts negative effects on unemployment spells. In 
other words, efficiency wages will tend to increase unemployment spells for those who 
are currently unemployed due to reduced turnover rates. 
Another model analyzes the effects of increased screemng costs following an 
mcrease in the mm1mum wage. Mixon (1978) indicates that some of this model's 
assumptions are consistent with those of the traditional neoclassical model (e.g. firms 
want to minimize costs and individuals want to maximize their expected income). A firm 
decides to increase screening costs, or becomes more selective when hiring, because it is 
no longer able to signal which type of worker is preferred with differential wages; high 
wages indicate a preference for high productivity workers, for example. During this 
process a firm will be more selective and tend to hire workers who appear to be more 
stable (Mixon 1978). Worker stability can be observed by previous work experience, or 
if the worker is young, education may be used as a proxy for stability (Mixon 1978). 
Less stable workers will not be hired in industries that are covered by the minimum wage, 
and thus, will move to the industries that are not covered. In these industries, workers 
who are less stable may receive sub-minimum wages. Assuming that the availability of 
jobs remains constant in the covered sectors, the time before a firm will hire a worker 
will increase. Also, employee-initiated quits will decrease within firms in the covered 
sectors because the workers tend to be more stable. In other words, there is a better fit 
between the firm and the employee in the covered industries. The currently unemployed 
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workers in the covered industries will experience increased unemployment durations due 
to firms' greater selectivity and decreased turnover rates associated with increased 
screening efforts. 
A search value model predicts that an increase in the minimum wage will reduce 
the search value associated with searching for alternative employment for low-wage 
workers. This model's assumptions are consistent with some of the traditional 
neoclassical theory, which indicate that firms want to minimize their costs and that 
workers want to maximize their expected income in a market with imperfect information 
(Mixon 1978). Prior to an increase in the minimum wage, a worker may seek alternative 
employment under the assumption that it would provide a higher wage. After an increase, 
however, the worker may not pursue alternative employment; this occurs because the 
probability that a worker's current wage will be higher than the wage that he may obtain 
from alternative employment (Grossberg and Sicilian 2004). Employee-initiated quits 
will decrease due to the increase in costs associated with searching for alternative 
employment. Mixon (1978) indicates that quit rates are inversely related to wage 
differentials and labor mobility. Thus, an increase in the minimum wage will decrease 
turnover rates within a firm. Assuming that the job availability remains constant within 
this and similar firms, the unemployment spell for those who are currently unemployed 
will increase. 
A model which analyzes the effects of non-monetary benefits on a firm's decision 
indicates that an increase in the minimum wage may cause a firm to decrease workers' 
non-monetary benefits (Wessels 1980; Card and Krueger 1995). This may occur when: 
(1) a firm's costs increase as much as the increase in the minimum wage and (2) a 
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worker's income increases as much as the minimum wage increases (Wessels 1980). 
This model emphasizes the search value of an alternative job, and is similar to the model 
previously discussed, but incorporates non-monetary benefits into the worker's 
compensation. For every one dollar increase in the minimum wage, a worker may lose a 
dollar (or some firm-determined amount) of non-monetary benefits in addition to the 
utility associated with it. For example, if the value of a job (both monetary and non-
monetary) at the firm where the worker is currently employed is less than the value of 
searching for a job at an alternative firm, then the worker will quit in order to pursue 
employment at the alternative firm; conversely, if the value of a job at the firm where the 
worker is currently employed is greater than the value of searching for a job at an 
alternative firm, then the worker will remain employed. Similar to a decrease in wages, a 
decrease in non-monetary benefits will decrease the value of the current job. 
According to this model, a firm will reduce non-monetary benefits because it is 
less costly than dismissing workers or reducing their hours worked - the predicted 
outcomes of an increase in the minimum wage for the traditional neoclassical model. It is 
important to note that the workers who typically receive non-monetary benefits are 
categorized as high-wage, and not those who are not currently employed at the minimum 
wage. Also, a reduction in overall non-monetary benefits increases as one moves up the 
wage distribution within a firm. "The corresponding reduction in the workers' non-wage 
income can more than offset the increase in the workers' money income" (Wessels 1980). 
This outcome is beneficial for the firm and not for the workers. As a result, employee-
initiated quits and turnover rates may increase following an increase in the minimum 
wage. An increase in job availability causes unemployment duration to decrease for 
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those who are currently unemployed under the assumption that a firm does not down-size 
and the pool of unemployed workers remains constant. 
Unemployment Duration 
Displacement is a problem in itself, but the length of time that an individual 
remains displaced may create even more problems within the economy. The length of 
unemployment duration for displaced workers has an immense impact on the overall 
well-being of the unemployed worker: a worker's net welfare is reduced. Prolonged 
spells of unemployment may result in the loss of human capital, seniority, benefits, and 
wage levels (Kiefer 1988; Addison and Portugal 1989). It is, therefore, important to 
observe the factors that may cause elongated unemployment duration, and those that may 
shorten unemployment duration. 
Researchers using the DWS typically estimate a model with the displacement rate 
(which is calculated by dividing the weighted number of displaced workers by the 
weighted number of workers who are at-risk of displacement) as the dependent variable 
and chosen individual and demographic characteristics as the independent variables 
(Fairlie and Kletzer 1997; Kletzer 1998). Others choose to estimate a model with 
unemployment duration as the dependent variable and similar independent variables to 
control for individual and demographic characteristics (Addison and Portugal 1987; 
Portugal and Addison 1990; Addison and Portugal 1992). 8 Regardless of the chosen 
dependent variable, age, gender, education, marital status, tenure, occupation, and 
industry are typically included in empirical models as core independent variables when 
observing displacement issues (Portugal and Addison 1990; Fairlie and Kletzer 1997; 
8 Grossberg and Sicilian (2004), however, examine the effect of minimum wages on employment duration. 
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McCall 1997; Fallick 1998). More specifically, the state minimum wage, receipt of UI 
and advanced notice, and reason for job loss are important factors to include in one's 
model when observing displaced workers' unemployment spells (Addison and Portugal 
1987; Portugal and Addison 1990; Addison and Portugal 1992; Grossberg and Sicilian 
2004). 
Grossberg and Sicilian (2004) estimate employment duration models to estimate 
the effects of an increase in the minimum wage on turnover rates. Their model is similar 
to those in the unemployment duration literature despite the different dependent variable. 
In their results, they find that an increase in the minimum wage decreases turnover rates 
for low-wage males when the minimum wage is low relative to the median state wage, 
and when the minimum wage has a more binding effect, turnovers for high-wage workers 
increase with an increase in the minimum wage. This theory can be indirectly applied to 
unemployment duration: if turnovers decrease then unemployment duration should 
increase, and if turnovers increase then unemployment duration should decrease, 
assuming that job availability is constant. 
Portugal and Addison (1990) pay special attention to sample construction when 
observing the effects of UI receipt and advance notification on the length of 
unemployment duration for displaced workers .9 The DWS contains individuals who are 
still unemployed at the time of the survey, which implies that their unemployment 
duration will have to be predicted. They estimate a base model, but vary the sample 
construction in order to observe the potential biases that may occur due to incorrect 
sample construction (Portugal and Addison 1990). Their model includes controls for 
9 See also, Addison and Portugal (1987) and Addison and Portugal (1992). 
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wages and the probability of exiting the state of unemployment because the high wage 
earners will tend to leave unemployment at higher rates than low wage earners. 
Receipt of advanced notice is arguably beneficial in aiding displaced workers to 
become re-employed at quicker rates than without it (Addison and Portugal 1992). 
Addison and Portugal (1992) estimate the effect of advance notification and find that they 
are conditional upon the type of worker that is observed. Blue-collar females, for 
example, are the only group of individuals who are not positively affected by receipt of 
advanced notice. Another approach, which measures the effect of advanced notice for 
those who became displaced due to plant closings, indicates that advanced notice 
decreased the unemployment duration especially for those who left the position before 
they were terminated (Addison and Portugal 1987). 10 Similar to much of the literature 
that has been discussed, I include this variable in my model due to the lack of consensus 
on its effect. 
It is evident that theory does not clearly indicate what effects an increase in the 
minimum wage will have on unemployment duration. Most of the theoretical minimum 
wage models discussed in this section have a propensity to predict increased 
unemployment durations following an increase in the minimum wage, and the empirical 
results observed in the unemployment duration literature are conditional upon sample 
construction or the chosen dependent variable. It is important to note the monopsony and 
the non-monetary benefits model because they predict shortened unemployment duration 
following an increase in the minimum wage, which is contrary to the other models' 
10 In contrast, Fallick ( 1997) argues that advanced notice is not an important determinant of displacement 
rates. 
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predictions. Because the theoretical models and many of the empirical results are 
inconclusive, further empirical work is necessary. 
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III. Data 
This study utilizes the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) for 1996, 1998, and 2000 
to answer the empirical question concerning the effects of the minimum wage on 
unemployment duration. It is a supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The 
survey is distributed every two years, and the collected samples are weighted to be 
representative of the entire population as the Bureau of the Census has defined it. 
Respondents are asked questions by means of telephone interviews and household visits. 
The respondent is asked to proceed to the DWS supplement only after they affirmatively 
answered the question which asks if they experienced job loss due to "a plant closing, an 
employer going out of business, a layoff from which he/she was not recalled or other 
similar reasons." Other questions concerning the area of residence and the characteristics 
of the individuals in the household are also asked. 
The DWS provides information on individual characteristics and pre- and post-
displacement job characteristics such as lost job and current job earnings, advanced 
notice, reason for displacement, and length of displacement. Because of the abundance of 
information on individual and employment characteristics for those who involuntarily 
become unemployed, it is the primary source of information for research on displaced 
workers in the United States. 11 The DWS is used in place of other surveys because it 
draws upon a large random sample of approximately 47,000 households each year. Other 
surveys, such as the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for example, do not 
provide as much information or as large of a sample of displaced workers as the DWS 
does. 
11 Information about the Displaced Workers Survey was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
the Bureau of the Census web page. http://www.bls.census .gov/cps/dispwkr/dwdes.htm 
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Displaced individuals are defined as having a significant attachment to the labor 
force, and the sample should be constructed in this manner. The analysis sample for each 
specification contains individuals who are 18 to 64 years old and not in the military. 
Individuals who are younger than 18 years old tend to have a weak attachment to the 
labor force because they are typically enrolled in school. Individuals who are older than 
64 years old also have a weak attachment to the labor force because they are usually 
retired or making the transition into retirement. 
Despite the positive aspects associated with using the DWS, it also has limitations. 
Due to the nature of survey data, observed unemployment spells may be incomplete for 
some individuals. This is known as a censoring problem, which Portugal and Addison 
(1990) address. Hypothetically, the censored, or currently unemployed, individual may 
become employed, for example, one week after the survey date or one year after the 
survey date. The censoring problem can be addressed with the use of maximum 
likelihood techniques and the estimation of survival (or duration) models. 
Recall bias is another problem associated with the DWS. Respondents are asked 
to recall information on the previous three years of employment history including the 
length of the most recent unemployment spell. The individual may not be able to 
precisely recall the number of weeks that they were unemployed following displacement, 
or the value of their pre-displacement earnings, particularly if their period of 
displacement occurred three years ago. The error associated with recall bias 1s 
incorporated into the error term of the estimated function and is present in almost all 
unemployment duration models. Because of problems related to censoring and recall 
bias, unemployment duration and displacement rates may be over- or under- estimated. 
Rohn 23 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all of the explanatory variables included 
in the empirical model. Individuals who did not receive UI benefits experienced shorter 
mean spells of unemployment compared to UI recipients. The average unemployment 
duration for female non-UI recipients was 6.6 weeks, whereas, female UI recipients had 
an average of 17.2 weeks. The average unemployment duration for male non-UI 
recipients was 5.1 weeks, whereas, male recipients had an average of 16.6 weeks. This is 
consistent with the findings of McCall (1997). His results indicate that females will 
experience longer spells of unemployment than males, and UI recipients will experience 
slightly longer spells of unemployment than non-UI recipients. Therefore, female UI-
recipients should have the longest spells of unemployment. Also, UI recipients tend to 
have higher levels of tenure when compared to non-UI recipients. 12 Female UI recipients 
had an average of 492.4 days of tenure for the pre-displacement job, whereas, female 
non-UI recipients had an average of 325.4 days. Male UI recipients had an average of 
471.1 days of tenure, and non-UI recipients had an average of338.4 days. 
Over half of the male and female displaced workers in the sample were employed 
in low-skilled occupations before displacement. 13 For example, 50.7 percent of male UI 
recipients and 47.7 percent ofnon-UI recipients were employed in low-skill occupations; 
66.1 percent of female UI recipients and 59.2 percent of non-UI recipients were 
employed in low-skiii occupations. Most workers (28-60 percent depending on UI 
receipt) became displaced due to insufficient work. 
12 Tenure (measured in days) is defined as the amount of time the individual was employed on the lost job. 
13 The following occupations have been defined as low-skill: sales, administrative support, private 
household services, protective services, operatives, transportation and moving, laborers, and those in 
farming, forestry, or fishing. 
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IV. Model 
The empirical model used to analyze the relationship between the state minimum 
wage and the unemployment duration for a displaced worker is a multivariate ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation. 14 This approach of using OLS regression differs from 
previous research on unemployment durations for displaced workers. Typically, hazard 
models are used to estimate unemployment and employment durations (Portugal and 
Addison 1990; McCall 2004). Hazard models are typically used because, contrary to 
OLS methods, the model is not forced to follow a linear form. This is important because 
durations typically exhibit some form of time dependence that may be non-linear with 
respect to the parameters. With the absence of a linear restraint, the estimates in the 
model may become more significant. If the model is forced to follow a linear form by 
utilizing OLS techniques, the coefficients may become biased and inefficient. The use of 
hazard models, however, is beyond the scope of this paper, and thus, OLS techniques are 
used. The empirical results of this paper are not significantly altered in sign or magnitude, 
although problems of misspecification could potentially occur when estimating the model 
using OLS. 15 
Following Addison and Portugal (1987 and 1990) and McCall (1997), the 
equation is estimated separately for UI recipients and non-UI recipients: 
k 
yits = a + I fJjXji + oMits +&its 
j=1 
(1) 
14 Hazard models were used with the same data and models as to observe the potential differences between 
them. The estimates for both methods remain similar in significance and magnitude. I believe, therefore, 
that my conclusions are not significantly affected by the estimation method. 
15 Professor Roberto Pedace estimated the duration models using the specifications (1) and (2), and has 
compared them to the OLS estimates. 
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where i, t, and s represent individual, time (year), and state, respectively. X is a vector of 
explanatory variables and M is a measure of the state minimum wage. The dependent 
variable is unemployment duration measured in weeks. Table 2 contains the definitions 
for all of the variables contained in X and M. 
Four alternative measures are used for the minimum wage: the standard state 
minimum, the lagged state minimum wage, the ratio of the state minimum wage to the 
median state wage, and the lagged ratio of the state minimum wage to the median state 
wage. These measures are included because the standard measurement for the state 
minimum wage may not accurately reflect the binding nature of the minimum wage for 
the typical worker across represented states. The median state wage variable is included 
to control for wage differentials by state (Couch and Wittenburg 2001). A state with a 
high median wage may not experience the same effects following an increase in the 
minimum wage once compared to a state with a low median wage. If the minimum wage 
is low compared to the median state wage, for example, there may be a smaller effect 
because it is less binding. Conversely, if the minimum wage is high compared to the 
median state wage, then it may have a larger effect because it is more binding. 16 
Education variables are included to control for reservation wage heterogeneity 
and productivity characteristics that may affect an individual's chances of finding 
employment. It is assumed that an individual's reservation wage increases as their level 
of education increases. Higher reservation wage heterogeneity may prevent an individual 
from becoming employed for a longer period of time. For example, an individual may 
16 Similar minimum wage measurements have been used by Fairris and Pedace (2004) and Grossberg and 
Sicilian (2004). 
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not become employed immediately following dismissal because they may be able to 
obtain a higher-paying job at a firm that has greater screening costs, or in other words, a 
longer period of time before the firm will employ an individual (Grossberg and Sicilian 
2004). Education controls are also included because they are proxies for skill and, 
consequently, employability. Accordingly, higher levels of education would reduce 
unemployment duration if there is a better match between the firm and the worker. Also, 
other research has shown that individuals with higher levels of education tend to be more 
mobile (Levy and Wadycki 1974). This can also result in shorter unemployment 
durations for those who are willing to move in order to obtain employment. 
It is also important to control for the reason for job-loss. A change in wages 
will cause some workers to quit while others remain employed until they become 
dismissed (Kletzer 1998). According to the traditional neoclassical model, for example, 
an increase in the minimum wage will increase a firm's costs of production and force it to 
downsize production. A worker in this situation may become unemployed because they 
were either dismissed or they quit before dismissal. The worker is more prepared for 
unemployment following an employee-initiated quit relative to a worker who is 
dismissed. I address this and other similar situations with the inclusion of variables that 
control for reason for job-loss. 
The United States economy experienced an immense amount of macroeconomic 
growth during this time period, which is evident in the values of the state unemployment 
rate in Table 2. The state unemployment rate is included in the model to control for the 
macroeconomic effects that vary from state to state and over time. This variable has been 
used in other studies (see Addison and Portugal 1992). Although this seems to be the 
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best method for controlling for macroeconomic effects, it is also problematic because 
states with high levels of unemployment will have workers who will take longer to find 
worker independent of the level of the minimum wage. Therefore, the unemployment 
rate may be correlated with the minimum wage. 
State and year effects are observed for reasons similar to those of the state 
unemployment rate. The exclusion of year and state effects may cause one's model to 
become biased because of correlation problems. Some studies, however, find that the 
inclusion of year effects render the model inadequate because of perfectly collinearity 
with the minimum wage measurements (Burkhauser, Couch, and Wittenburg 2000). This 
may occur because the minimum wage differences are larger over time then they are 
across states at a given point in time; the inclusion of year effects control for any shocks 
that may affect all states equally over a period of time. Couch and Wittenburg (2001) 
also argue that year effects cause estimates to become insignificant due to collinearity 
problems. Although Portugal and Addison (1990) do not use the minimum wage in their 
model, it is important to note that the inclusion of year dummies in their specifications 
did not render their parameter estimates insignificant and/or their model ineffective. The 
inclusion of state dummies, although useful for controlling state-specific characteristics, 
presents problems of "state-specific autocorrelation, state-specific heteroscedasticity, and 
across-state correlations" (Couch and Wittenburg 2001). To control for this, Couch and 
Wittenburg (2001) observe estimates with and without state dummies, and concluded that 
their estimates do not change with the inclusion of state effects. On the other hand, 
Fairris and Pedace (2004) found their results to be highly sensitive to the inclusion of 
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state effects. Because there is no consensus on the effects of year and state dummy 
inclusions, the model is estimated with and without them. The complete model becomes: 
k 
Y.·ts = a + ·l.JljXj,. + oMits +rSis + ¢T,.t +sits 
j=l 
(2) 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables, M is a measure of the state minimum wage, 
S is a set of dichotomous state indicators, and T is a set of year dummies. 
An indictor for unemployment insurance receipt is used to create sub-samples. 
The receipt of UI has been found to have a significant effect on unemployment duration 
for displaced workers (Portugal and Addison 1990; Fallick 1991). Individuals who 
receive UI benefits tend to have elongated unemployment duration relative to non-UI 
recipients (See Figure 1 ). I estimate models similar to those of Portugal and Addison 
(1990). Others have found that it is important to estimate duration models separately for 
males and females due to differences in overall unemployment spell length between the 
two groups (Portugal and Addison 1990; Lynch 1991; Light and Ureta 1992; Grossberg 
2000; Grossberg and Sicilian 2004). As a result, four separate models are estimated 
according to UI receipt and gender: (1) male UI recipients, (2) male non-UI recipients, (3) 
female UI recipients, and (4) female non-UI recipients. Within each model, state and 
year effects are observed. 
Additionally, I am interested in observing the robustness of my estimates. 
Following Couch and Wittenburg (2001), Fairris and Pedace (2004), and Grossberg and 
Sicilian (2004), I observe the robustness of the state minimum wage results by varying 
the specification and measurements accordingly. The base model is estimated with one 
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of four possible minimum wage measures: (1) the state minimum wage, (2) the lagged 
state minimum wage, (3) the state minimum wage relative to the state median wage and 
( 4) the lagged state minimum wage relative to the state median wage. Each of these is 
estimated with and without controls for the state unemployment rate. The effects of the 
state unemployment rate are estimated because they may be correlated with the minimum 
wage (Mixon 1978; Addison and Portugal 1990; Card and Krueger1995). Also, the 
lagged minimum wage values are examined to allow for the possibility that workers and 
firms may not respond instantaneously to the policy change. 
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V. Results 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) parameter estimates usmg the specifications in 
Equations 1 and 2 are presented in Tables 3-6 (these tables only include the standard 
measurement of the state minimum wage variable). Tables 7-10 include this and other 
measurements of the minimum wage. In general, the OLS estimates are consistent with 
those ofPortugal and Addison (1990). Similar levels of significance are observed in both 
studies: education, race, the state unemployment rate, and tenure were similar for non-UI 
recipients, and education, tenure, and the reason for job loss for similar for UI recipients. 
The estimates which were not significant in both studies still had the same effect on 
unemployment duration; if an individual was married, for example, there was a positive 
effect on unemployment duration, or in other words, that individual's unemployment 
spell was shortened. 
An increase in the minimum wage is associated with shortened unemployment 
duration for Ul recipients and non-recipients. The observed difference between UI 
recipients and non-recipients, however, is more evident. These results are given in 
Tables 7-10. The robustness and the binding nature of the minimum wage are also 
observed in these tables. 
The results in Tables 8 and 10 indicate shortened unemployment durations after 
both state and year effects are omitted for male and female UI recipients following a one 
dollar increase in the minimum wage. In addition to being statistically significant, the 
estimated effects are quantitatively significant as well. Unemployment durations for 
male and female UI recipients are shortened by 3.9 and 3.3 weeks, respectively. These 
results, however, are not binding for male UI recipients until the year effects are omitted 
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and state effects are included (Table 6 column 3). This indicates that the inclusion of the 
year effects creates collinearity problems (Couch and Wittenburg 2001). The estimates 
for female UI recipients are robust to the variation of minimum wage measurements 
(Table 8 columns 1 and 2). The median wage measurements are significant at the 10 
percent level. This suggests that while there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the minimum wage and unemployment duration for female UI recipients, it is 
not as strong as that for males. 
The results in Table 8 indicate that an increase in the minimum wage has negative 
effects on unemployment duration for male UI recipients. The standard minimum wage 
measurements show that unemployment duration is shortened by 3.7-4.7 weeks. Column 
1 shows that the minimum wage estimates are not significant after the measurement is 
varied to the relative median wage. Column 2 and 3 also indicate similar effects. The 
standard minimum wage estimates are significant at the 10 and 5 percent levels, 
respectively. Column 2, which includes year effects, is not as significant as 1 and 3. 
This occurs because of problems of collinearity associated with the simultaneous 
estimation of the minimum wage and/or year and state effects. Furthermore, all 
significance is lost when both year and state effects are included for similar reasons. 
The results in Table 1 0 indicate that an increase in the minimum wage shortens 
unemployment duration for female UI recipients. Both standard and relative median 
measurements of the minimum wage are significant at the 10 percent level when year and 
state effects are not included (Column 1). After the state effects are omitted, however, 
the standard minimum wage measurements lose significance. Similar to the previous 
specifications, these effects may be collinear with certain measurements of the minimum 
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wage. Column 2 indicates that the minimum wage may have a binding effect for female 
UI recipients. Columns 3 and 4, however, indicate a weak statistical relationship between 
the minimum wage and unemployment duration. Overall, there is a weak statistical 
relationship between the minimum wage and unemployment duration for female UI 
recipients. 
The results in Table 7 indicate that an increase in the mm1mum wage IS 
associated with shortened unemployment durations for male non-UI recipients. The state 
minimum wage measurements without the state unemployment rate included are 
significant at the 10 percent level after both year and state effects are omitted. For these 
estimates, unemployment duration is shortened by 1.56-1.67 weeks following a one 
dollar increase in the state minimum wage. The median wage measurements with and 
without the unemployment rate included are significant at the 10 percent level, and the 
lagged median wage measurements with and without the unemployment rates included 
are both significant at the 5 percent level. This may indicate that the state unemployment 
rate is collinear with the minimum wage. The statistical relationship between the 
m1mmum wage and unemployment duration weakens as state and year effects are 
included. After the state unemployment rate is omitted, the standard minimum wage 
estimates become significant at the 5 percent level. They indicate that, following a one 
dollar increase in the minimum wage, unemployment duration is shortened by 3.19-3.66 
weeks. This, again, may occur due to correlations between the state and year effects and 
the minimum wage. 
The results in Table 9 indicate shortened unemployment duration following an 
increase in the minimum wage for female non-UI recipients. Most of the standard 
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minimum wage measurements, however, are not significant. The relative median wage 
measurements, on the other hand, are significant at the 1 0 percent level after state and 
year effects are omitted, and when state effects are included without year effects 
(Columns 1 and 3). There exists a weak statistical relationship between the minimum 
wage and unemployment duration for female non-UI recipients. 
The median wage measurements are meant to capture the binding nature of the 
minimum wage in the respondent's state of residency. For all specifications, the 
magnitude of these estimates appears to be more negative than the standard 
measurements of the mm1mum wage. According to traditional neoclassical theory, 
standard minimum wage estimates may underestimate the effects of an increase in the 
minimum wage (Couch and Wittenburg 2001). This, however, does not occur in the 
empirical results. Once the average minimum wage is divided by the average median 
wage (given in Table 1), it is clear that the magnitudes and signs of the estimates are 
robust to different measurements of the minimum wage. In 2000, for example, the 
average state minimum wage was $5.28 and the average state median wage was $12.57. 
On average, the relative median wage variable was .42. A one dollar increase in the 
minimum wage would cause the average state minimum wage to become $6.28, and the 
average state median wage to remain at $12.57. The new relative median wage variable 
becomes .50. The difference between the relative median wage measurements is .08. 
The change in estimates for the median wage measurement may be observed by 
multiplying them by .08. The resulting effects produce estimates which are not 
significantly different from the original estimates. It can be concluded that the standard 
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minimum wage estimates do not grossly underestimate the effects of an increase in the 
minimum wage as Couch and Wittenburg (2001) argue. 
Rohn 35 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper I have investigated the effects of the state mm1mum wage on 
unemployment duration for UI recipients and non-recipients. The statistical relationship 
between the minimum wage and unemployment duration is essentially insignificant for 
females UI and non-UI recipients and male non-UI recipients. There is some statistically 
significant evidence that duration is reduced for male VI-recipients. Overall, the 
minimum wage tends to have a larger impact on unemployment duration for UI recipients 
relative to non-UI recipients. 
It is important to extend the current labor market theories concerning the effects 
of minimum wages on employment levels to encompass those on unemployment duration. 
The previously discussed theoretical models illustrate potential impacts of an increase in 
the minimum wage on employment levels, and indirect impacts on unemployment 
durations. In general, the empirical results cannot be reconciled with traditional 
neoclassical labor market theory. My findings, however, are the most consistent with the 
theories of Card and Krueger (1995) and Wessels (1980), which relax some of the 
traditional neoclassical assumptions. It is not possible, however, to positively confirm 
either theory in this study due to the limitations of the data. 
Intuitively, one would predict that UI recipients would not have much of a 
response to an increase in the minimum wage because of their receipt of supplemental 
income. The following are two possible instances where the minimum wage would have 
a larger impact on UI recipients than non-UI recipients: First, the minimum wage may 
have a larger impact on UI recipients because they will have a lower reservation wage 
relative to non-UI recipients. At the early stages of their unemployment spell, UI 
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recipients and non-UI recipients may have similar reservation wages. The reservation 
wage should decline as unemployment duration increases because the opportunity cost of 
remaining unemployed is increasing i.e. loss of human capital, immediate income, and 
expenence. Because UI recipients have longer mean unemployment duration, an 
increase in the mm1mum wage may become more attractive to them because their 
reservation wage is significantly lower. Non-UI recipients' reservation wages may 
decrease at the same rate as the UI recipients', but the net decline in the UI recipients' 
reservation wage may be greater. Second, an increase in the minimum wage may 
increase a firm's costs of production as indication in the traditional neoclassical model. 
This model predicts that a firm will dismiss works whose productivity level is below the 
new minimum wage. A substitution effect may occur: UI recipients tend to have high 
levels of education, tenure, and pre-displacement earnings, which make them attractive to 
firms that are looking for highly productive individuals. The firms that dismiss the low-
productivity workers may substitute them with the highly productive UI recipients, 
assuming that job availability remains constant. 
Higher minimum wages do not appear to be responsible for longer unemployment 
duration, which suggests that a policy of increasing the minimum wage may be beneficial 
to workers even if there are some small negative employment effects. As the theory 
illustrates, the effects on unemployment duration may be conditional upon the wage-
setting power of a firm, the level of skill associated with a labor market, or a firm's 
ability to affect worker productivity. These particular labor-market issues, in addition to 
UI recipients' response to an increase in the minimum wage, have important theoretical 
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implications for displaced worker Wlemployment duration and remam important for 
future research. 
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Table 1 
Analysis Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable: 
Spell Length 16.6044 15 .7906 5.0744 17 .3155 17. 1735 21.0163 6.6454 15.8205 
(19.4287) (18.3571) (11 .6825) (23.6148) (17.3192) (21.3952) (14.8656) (21.0351) 
Min Wage Variables: 
State Min Wage 4.8978 4.8294 4.9775 4.8645 4.9397 4.9046 4.9357 4.9302 
(.5201) (.5350) (.51 08) (.5488) (.5232) (.5185) (.4812) (.5548) 
State Min Wage Lag 4.9052 4.8238 4.9801 4.8555 4.9235 4.9152 4.9290 4.9394 
(.5456) (.5462) (.5317) (.5616) (.5214) (.5550) (.4992) (.5824) 
State Min Wage/ .4280 .4208 .4388 .4318 .4318 .4290 .4364 .4379 
Median Wage (.0498) (.0532) (.0500) (.0567) (.0507) (.0528) (.0497) (.0587) 
State Min Wage/ .4286 .4202 .4390 .4308 .4304 .4297 .4357 .4384 
Median Wage Lag (.0511) (.0530) (.0512) (.0566) (.0514) (.0542) (.0502) (.0586) 
Other Indep Variables: 
Age 38.2625 39.2607 34.3912 33.9786 39.4260 41.3902 35 .9229 32.5128 
(9.9594) (10.3818) (10.5256) (11.5768) (10.1571) (10 .0569) (10 .7034) (9.8852) 
High School .4325 .4957 .4440 .3797 .4184 .4228 .3694 .4786 
(.4959) (.5011) (.4971) (.4866) (.4939) (.4960) (.4830) (.5017) 
Some Coli .1959 .1966 .2101 .2193 .2577 .1707 .2537 .1966 
(.3973) (.3983) (.4076) (.4149) (.4379) (.3778) (.4355) (.3991) 
Associate Degree .1128 .0726 .0927 .0374 .1097 .0894 .1231 .0598 
(.3166) (.2601) (.2901) (.1903) (.3129) (.2865) (.3288) (.2382) 
Bachelors Degree .0776 .0513 .0808 .0802 .1046 .0732 .1231 .0342 
(.2678) (.2210) (.2727) (.2724) (.3064) (.2615) (.3288) (.1825) 
Graduate Degree .0240 .0128 .0119 .0214 .0179 .0081 .0267 .0256 
(.1533) (.1127) (.1083) (.1451) (.1326) (.0902) (.1613) (.1587) 
Tenure 471.0869 452.4915 338.4256 183.0963 492.4005 520.5285 325 .3709 134.7094 
(591.4920) 616.5706 (542.1811) (339.7629) (589.0179) (661.9001) (483.5088) (191.4382) 
Ln Weekly Earnings 7.0132 7.0644 6.8496 6.7082 6.7576 6.6882 6.6762 6.4741 
(.4211) (.4675) (.4792) (.4415) (.3651) (6.6882) (.4289) (.3314) 
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Married .6451 .5556 .5668 .3102 .5026 .5122 .4599 .3248 
(.4789) (.4980) (.4958) (.4638) (.5006) (.5019) (.4988) (.4703) 
State Unemp Rate 4.6569 4.9818 4.4556 4.9846 4.3759 4.6490 4.3998 4.7017 
( 1.1749) (1.2580) (1.2004) (1.4322) (1.0646) (1.2165) (1.1783) (1.2407) 
Low Skill .5065 .5641 .4774 .5882 .6607 .6829 .5920 .5983 
(.5004) (.4969) (.4998) (.4935) (.4741) (.4672) (.4918) (.4924) 
Black .0665 .1111 .0905 .1872 .1173 .1545 .1068 .2821 
(.2495) (.3149) (.2871) (.3911) (.3222) (.3629) (.3091) (.4519) 
Asian/Pacific Islander .0444 .0385 .0162 .0321 .0357 .0244 .0267 .0342 
(.2061) (.1927) (.1262) (.1767) (.1858) (.1549) (.1613) (.1825) 
American Indian .0148 .0299 .0172 .0374 .0102 .0244 .0178 .0513 
(.1208) (.1707) (.1302) (.1903) (.1 006) (.1549) (.1323) (.2215) 
Advance Notice .3567 .2479 .2381 .1551 .3699 .3089 .3071 .2906 
(.4795) (.4327) (.4262) (.3630) (.4834) (.4639) (.4616) (.4560) 
Job Move .0924 .0342 .1239 .0642 .0638 .0163 .0682 .0427 
(.2899) (.1821) (.3297) (.2457) (.2447) (.1270) (.2524) (.2031) 
Insufficient Work .5065 .6026 .5054 .5829 .2806 .4065 .3516 .5214 
(.5004) (.4904) (.5002) (.4944) (.4499) (.4932) (.4778) (.5017) 
Position Abolished .1719 .1111 .1541 .1497 .2628 .2358 .2641 .1880 
(.3776) (.3150) (.3612) (.3578) (.4407) (.4262) (.4412) (.3924) 
MSA City .2015 .2265 .2381 .2834 .2245 .2683 .2522 .2821 
(.4015) (.4195) (.4262) (.4519) (.4178) (.4449) (.4346) (.4519) 
State Min Wage 4.8978 4.8294 4.9775 4.8645 4.9397 4.9046 4.9357 4.9302 
(.5201) (.5350) (.51 08) (.5488) (.5232) (.5185) (.4812) (.5548) 
1998 Survey .3253 .2692 .3276 .2727 .2832 .2927 .3264 .3162 
(.4689) (.4445) (.4696) (.4466) (.4511) (.4569) (.4692) (.4670) 
2000 Survey .2588 .2393 .3481 .2406 .3673 .3252 .3220 .2906 
(.4384) (.4276) (.4766) (.4286) (.4827) (.4704) (.4676) (.4560) 
N 541 234 928 187 392 123 674 117 
Notes: (1) Male, UI Recipients (completed spells), (2) Male, UI Recipients (incomplete spells), (3) Male, non-UI Recipients (completed spells), (4) Male, non-UI 
Recipients (incomplete spells), (5) Female, UI Recipients (completed spells), (6) Female, UI Recipients (incomplete spells), (7) Female, non-UI Recipients 
(completed spells), (8) Female, non-UI Recipients (incomplete spells). 
*Mean values reported and standard deviations in parentheses. 
Table 2 
Explanatory Variables and Controls 
Socio-Economic Variables: 
Age Indicates an individual's age at the time of the interview (in 
Male 
High School 
Some College 
Associate Degree 
Bachelor's Degree 
Graduate Degree 
Married 
White 
Black 
Asian/Pacific Islander 
American Indian 
Low Skill 
years). 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent is male, and 
zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent's highest 
level of education is high school, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent completed 
some college, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent received an 
associate's degree, and zero other wise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent received a 
bachelor's degree, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent received a 
graduate degree, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if the respondent is 
married, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent is White, and 
zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent is Black, and 
zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent is Asian or 
Pacific Islander, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent is American 
Indian, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator variable which equals one if respondent worked in a 
low-skilled occupation, and zero otherwise. 
St. Unemployment Rate Represents the state unemployment rate. 
State Min. Wage The value of the minimum wage in the individual's state of 
State Min. Lagged 
State Min. Wage/ 
State Median 
State Min. Wage/ 
State Median Lagged 
Unemployment Duration 
residence. 
The value of the lagged minimum wage in the individual's 
state of residence. 
The value of the minimum wage relative to the median wage in 
an individual's state of residence. 
The value of the minimum wage relative to the lagged median 
wage in an individual's state of residence. 
Reported unemployment duration (measured in weeks). 
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Year Dummy Variables: 
Year 1996 Indicator variable which equals one if 1996 interview year, and 
zero otherwise. 
Year 1998 Indicator variable which equals one if 1998 interview year, and 
zero otherwise. 
Year 2000 Indicator variable which equals one if 2000 interview year, and 
zero otherwise. 
Variables Describing Lost Job and Previous Employment: 
Job Move Indicator variable which equals one if respondent lost job due 
to a job move, and zero otherwise. 
Insufficient Work Indicator variable which equals one if respondent lost job due 
to insufficient work, and zero otherwise. 
Position Abolished Indicator variable which equals one if respondent lost job due 
to the position being abolished, and zero otherwise. 
Tenure Indicates the number of years the individual worked at her 
previous job. 
Ln Weekly Earnings Represents the natural log of the weekly earnings an individual 
received before displacement. 
Region Variable: 
MSACity Indicator variable which equals one if respondent is located 
within the central city of the Metropolitan Statistical Area, and 
zero if she is not. 
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Table 3 
OLS Unemployment Spell Estimates, Male non-UI Recipients 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
•• •• •• • • Age . 1238 .1121 .1330 .1324 
(.0560) (.0561) (.0594) (.0594) 
High School -2.0966 -2.1579 -2.3714 -2.5104 
(1.4914) (1.4903) (1.5860) (1.5899) 
... . .. • •• ... Some College -4.2878 -4.3773 -4.2629 -4.4462 
(1.3941) (1.3990) (1.529) (1.5360) 
Associate Degree -2.0923 -2.1384 -2.0522 -2.2661 
(2.1278) (2.1266) (2.3577) (2.3438) 
Bachelors Degree -1.6570 -1.7286 -1.8700 -2.0774 
(1.8958) (1.9113) (1.8914) (1.9141) 
Graduate Degree 3.8511 3.9583 3.2889 3.5813 
(4.5885) (4.5207) (4.7301) (4.6656) 
.. .. •• • • Tenure -.0018 -.0017 -.0019 -.0018 
(.0008) (.0008) (.0009) (.0009) 
** 
.. .. . . 
Ln Weekly Earnings -2.1400 -2.2827 -2.3160 -2.4690 
(1.1184) (1.1250) (1.1570) (1.1564) 
Married -.7125 -.6837 -.6764 -.6292 
(.9504) (.9504) (.9698) (.9697) 
** State Unemp Rate .6862 1.0977 .2070 1.3596 
(.4198) (.5283) (.8776) (1.0709) 
* Low Skill 1.3923 1.4900 1.2644 1.3603 
(.9289) (.9342) (.9730) (.9775) 
• * ... ... Black 2.7408 2.5869 3.9131 3.7405 
(1.4812) (1.4764) (1.5169) (1.5116) 
Asian/Pacific Islander .3610 .6279 -.8861 -.7355 
(2.0179) (2.0486) (2.3380) (2.2989) 
American Indian .4771 .8732 1.0400 1.5070 
(2.1223) (2.1300) (2.2687) (2.3111) 
Advance Notice .1153 .0013 -.0550 -.1465 
(1.3408) (1.3470) (1.2870) (1.2860) 
Job Move .8731 .9744 1.0316 1.0743 
(1.4204) ( 1.415) (1.5078) (1.4966) 
Insufficient Work 1.0273 1.1716 1.2257 1.2900 
(1.1410) (1.1198) (1.2501) (1.2379) 
Position Abolished .2677 .4595 .7747 .8404 
(1.0990) (1.0671) (1.1852) (1.1657) 
MSA City 1.4604 1.4675 1.3365 1.3719 
(1.1594) (1.1660) (1.2104) (1.2053) 
.. 
State Min Wage -1.1673 -3.1915 -1.410 -2.2055 
(.9600) (1.5936) (1.4057) (2.6844) 
Year Effects no yes no yes 
State Effects no no yes yes 
R-Squared .0443 .0474 .0730 .0756 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; • statistically significant at the .I 0 level, "at the .05 level, and "'at the .OJ level. 
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Table 4 
OLS Unemployment Spell Estimates, Male UI Recipients 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
••• ... ** • Age .2014 .2017 .1722 .1729 
(.0840) (.0851) (.0912) (.0917) 
High School -2.3351 -2.237 -1.304 -1.2254 
(2.3886) (2.3567) (2.7376) (2.7137) 
• * Some College -4.3112 -4.2709 -3.1728 -3.2058 
(2.4455) (2.4354) (2.7170) (2.7292) 
Associate Degree -.1375 -.1369 .1723 .2023 
(3.0831) (3.0670) (3.2690) (3.2662) 
Bachelors Degree -6.8317 *** 
... • • 
-6.6675 -5.2485 -5.1649 
(2.8455) (2.8257) (3.1850) (3.1623) 
Graduate Degree 1.1495 1.4330 3.8915 -5.1649 
(6.5299) (6.5464) (5.6340) (5.6563) 
• Tenure .0028 .0029 .0027 3.9504 
(.0016) (.0016) (.0017) (.0017) 
Ln Weekly Earnings -1.8547 -1.7686 -1.3804 .0028 
(2.0771) (2.0542) (2.2494) (2.2415) 
Married -.8528 -.8869 -.7481 -1.2260 
(1.6569) (1.6546) (1.5595) (1.5641) 
State Unemp Rate 1.2412 1.3752 .0901 -.7429 
(1.0007) (1.2219) (1.4257) (2.1169) 
Low Skill .8454 .8491 1.1849 -.5482 
(1.4597) (1.4625) (1.4488) (1.4443) 
Black 6.3837 6.2646 6.6362 1.1898 
(4.4794) (4.7727) (5.6852) (5.6288) 
Asian/Pacific Islander 1.3453 1.3976 -2.6714 -2.8453 
(3.7819) (3.8116) (3.8002) (3.7572) 
American Indian -.8477 -.6805 -.4524 -.3750 
(4.1295) ( 4.1659) (6.5016) (6.4706) 
*** *** 
... ... 
Advance Notice 5.1380 5.1967 5.5586 5.6108 
(1.8610) (1.8617) (2.0622) (2.0767) 
Job Move 
... . .. . .. 
8.7363 8.9351 9.8553 9.9747 
(3.3318) (3.3551) (3.5633) (3.5814) 
Insufficient Work -.6115 -.4094 -1.0615 -.9835 
(1.9757) (1.9574) (2.1420) (2.0971) 
Position Abolished 1.1651 1.3019 .3088 .3075 
(2.5751) (2.5518) (2.6050) (2.5277) 
MSA City 3.1062 3.0286 2.8684 2.7921 
(2.34182) (2.3699) (2.2889) (2.2901) 
••• •• • • State Min Wage -3.9027 -5.3743 -5.6702 -6.2431 
(1.3890) (2.7445) (2.5175) (5.2981) 
Year Effects no yes no yes 
State Effects no no yes yes 
R-Squared .1004 .1014 .1463 .1471 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; · statistically significant at the .10 level," at the .05 level, and'" at the .01 level. 
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Table 5 
OLS Unemployment Spell Estimates, Female non-UI Recipients 
Explanatory Variable (I) (2) (3) (4) 
Age .0302 .0301 .0040 .0058 
(.0058) (.0556) (.0584) (.0586) 
High School -2.4230 -2.4400 -2.6388 -2.6577 
(2.3394) (2.3314) (2.5427) (2.5034) 
Some College -1.5953 -1.5618 -1.4744 -1.6087 
(2.4572) (2.4571) (2.6292) (2.6185) 
* * Associate Degree -4.0812 -4.0857 -3.9904 -3.9695 
(2.4958) (2.5050) (2.6386) (2.6185) 
Bachelors Degree -2.9638 -2.9419 -2.7780 -2.7431 
(2.9606) (2.9633) (3.1468) (3.1275) 
Graduate Degree -.1684 -.1743 -.8446 -.9220 
(3.1211) (3.1386) (3.3014) (3.3024) 
Tenure -.0009 -.0009 -.0001 -.0001 
(.0011) (.0012) (.0012) (.0012) 
* * * Ln Weekly Earnings -2.7773 -2.7993 -2.6499 -2.8156 
(1.5508) (1.5428) (1.6625) (1.679) 
Married 1.6124 1.6031 1.1706 1.2543 
(1.1547) (1.1463) (1.2527) (1.2461) 
. 
State Unemp Rate .8969 .8229 -3.544 .2467 
(.5042) (.5972) (1.5021) (1.8278) 
... 
*** 
... . .. 
Low Skill 2.9746 2.960 2.9489 2.8832 
(1.1656) (1.1611) (1.1690) (1.1581) 
. • • • Black 4.0036 3.9984 4.1432 4.1686 
(2.3646) (2.3366) (2.3652) (2.3192) 
* Asian/Pacific Islander -1.1867 -1.2467 -2.9455 -3.2246 
(1.9280) (1.9337) (2.0467) (2.0084) 
American Indian -.6511 -.6208 -1.1359 -.9170 
(2.6981) (2.7419) (2.7700) (2.7351) 
Advance Notice -.7617 -.7762 -.8877 -.8714 
(1.2329) (1.2280) (1.2551) (1.2505) 
Job Move .2402 .2673 .1150 .2620 
(1.7705) (1.7810) (1.8754) (1.8869) 
Insufficient Work -.2066 -.2209 -.7651 -.6771 
(1.5241) (1.5309) (1.5002) (1.4862) 
Position Abolished -1.7041 -1.6703 -1.8931 -1.8048 
(1.3222) (1.3295) (1.3013) (1.2995) 
MSA City 1.5410 1.5735 2.2989 2.3034 
(1.5081) (1.5146) (1.5641) (1.5495) 
State Min Wage -.9014 -.2281 -2.8737 -6.5325 
(1.2306) (2.6254) (1.9120) (4.6517) 
Year Effects no yes no yes 
State Effects no no yes yes 
R-Squared .0541 .0543 .1118 .1134 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ' statistically significant at the .1 0 level, " at the .05 level, and '" at the .01 level. 
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Table 6 
OLS Unemployment Spell Estimates, Female UI Recipients 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
. • • Age .1324 .1303 .1516 .1515 
(.0781) (.0813) (.0828) (.0847) 
High School .6233 .6611 1.7229 1.6414 
(3.2308) (3.2591) (3.4150) (3.4147) 
Some College .3140 .4113 .99023 1.0619 
(3.5743) (3.5793) (3.7371) (3.7404) 
Associate Degree -.5831 -.5201 -.3249 -.4449 
(3.9734) (3.9831) (4.2054) (4.2206) 
Bachelors Degree .3750 .1905 .7526 .5568 
(3.9730) (4.0034) (4.4996) (4.5055) 
Graduate Degree -2.1228 -2.2036 -1.8366 -2.3886 
(5.0223) (5.1555) (5.8523) (6.0417) 
Tenure .0009 .0010 -.0001 .0000 
(.0015) (.0015) (.0016) (.0017) 
Ln Weekly Earnings 1.4961 1.4468 1.3687 1.3240 
(2.6479) (2.6522) (2.8529) (2.8920) 
Married 2.2823 2.2960 1.7366 1.7988 
(1.6352) (1.6361) (1.8308) (1.8456) 
State Unemp Rate -.0567 -.0783 -.4916 -1.9872 
(.80414) (1.0303) (2.1311) (2.8694) 
Low Skill -1.1230 -1.3062 -1.4020 -1.5685 
(2.0705) (2.0920) (2.1314) (2.1417) 
Black 4.1011 4.1407 3.7126 3.9063 
(2.8466) (2.9135) (2.8592) (2.9171) 
* * Asian/Pacific Islander -7.9694 -8.4246 -9.2023 -9.5042 
(4.458) (4.6016) (5.8392) (5.9287) 
American Indian -4.6958 -4.8970 -7.9206 -8.0138 
(3.3243) (3.3148) (6.2148) (6.1368) 
Advance Notice -2.1155 -2.0682 -1.0692 -1.0738 
(2.0273) (2.0289) (2.1454) (2.1455) 
* * Job Move 6.1742 6.3634 4.2458 4.3457 
(3.7746) (3.7629) (3.631 0) (3.6857) 
Insufficient Work 1.5503 1.7924 1.9968 2.2435 
(1.9930) (2.0373) (2.0580) (2.1128) 
* • Position Abolished 3.5887 6.5659 3.7600 3.7548 
(2.366) (2.3545) (2.3017) (2.2930) 
••• ••• • •• . .. MSA City 6.8372 6.8396 6.8603 6.7447 
(2.7503) (2.7626) (2.8157) (2.7861) 
•• State Min Wage -3.3000 -4.1259 -3.2880 -4.7800 
(1. 7323) (3.2431) (2.8747) (5.1515) 
Year Effects no yes no yes 
State Effects no no yes yes 
R-Squared .0759 .0786 .1590 .1616 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; · statistically significant at the .10 level, •• at the .05level, and ''' at the .01 level. 
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Table 7 
Summary of Minimum Wage Effects on Unemployment Spell Length, Male non-UI Recipients 
Min Wage Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Min Wage -1.1673 -3.1915'* -1.4101 -2.2055 
(.9600) (1.5936) (1.4057) (2.6844) 
State Min Wage -1.5643* -1.4174 -1.6401 -2.4700 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (.9382) (1.4626) (1.0962) (2.7370) 
State Min Wage Lag -1.3203 -3.6587··· -1.7099 -3.3192 
(.8924) (1.3995) (1.3845) (2.8504) 
State Min Wage Lag -1.6667' -1.8397 -1.7541 -3.6378 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (.8811) (1.2528) (1.0841) (2.9056) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage -13.6126* -9.8023 -22.0781 -2.9791 
(8.0737) (8.6300) (17.3143) (24.8350) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage -16.0826* -9.5824 -27.3429 -4.5253 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (8.2946) (8.6154) (17.5721) (25.2698) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage Lag -15.5592** -12.4223 -25.0657 -10.0163 
(7.8021) (8.5047) (16.6752) (26.0387) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage Lag -17.7192** -11.7882 -29.9743* -11.9034 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (8.0211) (8.4112) (16.9703) (26.4870) 
Year Effects no yes no yes 
State Effects no no yes yes 
Note: Robust standard enors in parentheses; · statistically significant at the .10 level, · · at the .05level, and'" at the .01 level. 
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Table 8 
Summary of Minimum Wage Effects on Unemployment Spell Length, Male UI Recipients 
Min Wage Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Min Wage -3.9027*** -5.3743* -5.6702** -6.2431 
(1.3890) (2.7445) (2.5175) (5.2981) 
State Min Wage -4.6634*** -3.6785* -5.7632** -6.1129 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (1.6471) (2.1529) (2.2795) (5.5055) 
State Min Wage Lag -3.7189··· -4.9812* -5.4761 •• -6.4796 
(1.3235) (2.5903) (2.4705) (5.6765) 
State Min Wage Lag -4.4291*** -3.3214. -5.6258 .. -6.3317 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (1.5723) (1.9704) (2.2411) (5.9045) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage -8.9265 1.4620 -54.0355 -75.7815 
(15.0060) (16.5478) (35.5089) (51.7670) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage -15.2715 1.6475 -78.9121* -74.9183 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (16.9123) (16.4530) (40.3627) (53.4441) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage Lag -9.8737 .6707 -52.2102 -80.7875 
(14.7702) (16.5017) (34.7961) (55.7786) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage Lag -15.7483 1.2520 -76.9106* -79.8070 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (16.6069) (16.2542) (39.5313) (57.7097) 
Year Effects no yes no yes 
State Effects no no yes yes 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; • statistically significant at the .l 0 level, " at the .05 level, and "' at the .0 I level. 
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Table 9 
Summary of Minimum Wage Effects on Unemployment Spell Length, Female non-UI Recipients 
Min Wage Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Min Wage -.9014 -.2281 -2.8737 -6.5325 
(1.2306) (2.6254) (1.9120) (4.6517) 
State Min Wage -1.3087 1.2170 -2.4840* -6.5708 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (1.2436) (2.4416) (1.3937) (4.6311) 
State Min Wage Lag -.7221 .5471 -2.5261 -6.1287 
(1.2529) (2.7015) (1.8021) (4.7009) 
State Min Wage Lag -1.0824 1.8409 -2.2937 -6.1796 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (1.2644) (2.4801) (1.3956) (4.7339) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage -21.7160* -21.9849 -39.9474* -66.5244 
(11.9349) (14.1088) (22.5634) (42.5053) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage -21.7108. -20.1667 -44.8789** -66.5031 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (11.9951) (14.0350) (22.1410) (42.4265) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage Lag -20.3792* -20.7507 -35.5450* -64.9543 
(11.6592) (13.6319) (21.4236) ( 41.6298) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage Lag -20.1337* -18.4929 -40.8351 -65.1664 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (11.7054) (13.5493) (21.5370) (41.6697) 
Year Effects no yes no yes 
State Effects no no yes yes 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; • statistically significant at the .10 level," at the .05level, and '" at the .Ollevel. 
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Table 10 
Summary of Minimum Wage Effects on Unemployment Spell Length, Female UI Recipients 
Min Wage Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State Min Wage -3.3000' -4.1259 -3.2880 -4.7800 
(1.7323) (3.2431) (2.8747) (5.1515) 
State Min Wage -3.2642' -4.2398 -2.7384 -3.5019 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (1.7180) (2.9473) (2.0420) (5.0541) 
State Min Wage Lag -3.1124' -3.4562 -3.4774 -6.6479 
(1.6820) (3.0861) (2.8614) (5.9274) 
State Min Wage Lag -3.1051* -3.6309 -2.8344 -5.2731 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (1.6788) (2.7691) (2.0566) (5.7828) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage -28.8531 * -33.1136* -19.9261 -86.3854 
(16.5869) (18.1919) (37.9893) (59.3631) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage -29.6438' -33.3443* -32.3201 -66.6197 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (16.9118) (18.1525) (37.4639) (56.0619) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage Lag -26.9829* -30.7359* -21.5721 -97.1121 
(16.1719) (17.8264) (36.8147) (62.6526) 
State Min Wage/State Median Wage Lag -27.7582. -31.0851' -33.0229 -78.2259 
(w/o State Unemp Rate) (16.4884) (17.7871) (36.5632) (59.0937) 
Year Effects no yes no yes 
State Effects no no yes yes 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses;' statistically significant at the .I 0 level, •• at the .05 level, and ••• at the .01 level. 
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Figure 1 
Survival Functions for UI Recipients and Non-Recipients 
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